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DOES JUDAISM HAVE DOGMAS?

A Critique of “The Limits of Orthodox Theology” – a response to Rabbi Marc B. Shapiro

 Introduction

Maimonides (the great legal scholar and philosopher of the 12^th century), is the first and only thinker in the Jewish tradition to codify a set of principles of faith within a legal framework as a binding theological dogma in codifying his “13 Principles of Faith” as commandments in his law code, the Mishneh Torah. His “13 Principles of Faith” are a comprehensive set of principles (including among others existence of God, Divine revelation, Divine providence, the coming of the messiah, and revival of the dead), and are widely accepted throughout the orthodox world (modern orthodox and ultra-orthodox) as a binding dogma. In my view, Maimonides was aware that a codification of a binding dogma is a distortion of Talmudic Judaism, according to which the commandments of the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) as the basis of Jewish law are commandments of doing and not doing (mitzvot aseh and lo ta’aseh), and not of faith or belief. In my view, Maimonides codified his principles only for the unlearned Jewish masses as a political and religious leader (and not as a philosopher) in the main for historical reasons in order to strengthen them (as Christians and Moslems had codified principles of belief).

Maimonides’ “13 Principles of Faith” became so widely accepted in the medieval period that a concise version summarizing the principles by an anonymous author even entered into the traditional Jewish prayer book. I will briefly summarize the subject of each of the principles according to this version:

1. The Existence of God as the Creator of the universe
2. Unity of God
3. Incorporeality of God
4. Eternity of God
5. Worship of God
6. Prophecy
7. Mosaic Prophecy
8. Divine Revelation of the Torah
9. Immutability of the Torah
10. Providence
11. Reward and Punishment
12. The Coming of the Messiah
13. Revival of the Dead

The philosophic conception that is reflected in the codification of a binding dogma by Maimonides that Judaism demands philosophic principles of belief that one must accept characterizes the orthodox world (modern orthodox and ultra-orthodox) perhaps more than anything else – even though not necessarily all of the principles that Maimonides codified are accepted by all in the orthodox world or even though there may be additional principles that are accepted as binding dogma by many in addition to those codified by Maimonides (such as belief in free will and the notion of chosen people).

Rabbi Marc B. Shapiro, in his work “The Limits of Orthodox Theology”, argues that Maimonides’ “13 Principles of Faith” are not the last word in orthodox, Jewish theology. Rabbi Shapiro analyzes each of Maimonides “13 Principles”, and demonstrates that there have been opinions and beliefs expressed in the Jewish tradition (prior to and after Maimonides’ codification of his “13 Principles” as a binding dogma) in contradistinction to each and every one of the “13 Principles”.

My critique here of Rabbi Shapiro’s work “The Limits of Orthodox Theology” will be understandable without reading his book.

The main thrust of Rabbi Shapiro’s argument is a historical analysis – and, in my mind, his argument that Maimonides’ “13 Principles” from a historical point of view are not the last word in orthodox, Jewish theology cannot be disputed, as the evidence that he cites is overwhelming. I also want to add that in my eyes Rabbi Shapiro is a true scholar (and, I am merely a teacher of Jewish studies, and not a scholar) – and, his work “The Limits of Orthodox Theology” is in my eyes a monumental work. I have utmost respect for Rabbi Shapiro in spite of the disagreement that I will voice here in this critique.

My disagreement with Rabbi Shapiro does not concern his main argument that I have just summarized. My disagreement concerns a secondary argument of Rabbi Shapiro, which he discusses only briefly – he argues that even though Maimonides’ “13 Principles” are not the last word in orthodox theology, nevertheless Judaism does have dogmas. In my view, this is a complete misconception on the part of Rabbi Shapiro.

Rabbi Shapiro suggests that “all would agree that belief in God and some sort of revelation are dogmas that the tradition has always affirmed” (“The Limits of Orthodox Theology”, p. 29) – and, in my view, it is simply not true that Judaism has always affirmed (in the sense of required) dogmas such as belief in God and Divine revelation. In my view, the source of the difficulty in Rabbi Shapiro’s argument that Judaism does have dogmas is that he does not define his terms – he does not define the term Judaism and, more importantly, he does not define the term dogma.

Does Judaism have dogmas?

Regarding the term Judaism, it is clear that Rabbi Shapiro is speaking about traditional, rabbinic Judaism. However, the central issue here is what period in the Jewish tradition we are speaking about in relation to the question of whether Judaism has dogmas – Biblical Judaism is not Talmudic Judaism, and Talmudic Judaism is not medieval Judaism.

Regarding the term dogma, the meaning can only be that a belief in order to be considered a dogma must be a belief that one is required to accept or affirm. If the intention is a belief that is central (and important) in the Jewish tradition but not a requirement to accept or affirm, then this would be a very diluted notion of dogma – and, it would not be controversial to argue that Judaism has such dogmas (in the sense of central beliefs). Certainly, belief in God is a central religious concept in the Bible, Talmudic tradition and throughout Jewish history – however, in the Bible and Talmudic tradition belief in God is not a dogma in the sense of a requirement to accept or affirm, and it becomes a dogma in this sense in the Jewish tradition only in the medieval period.

Moreover, traditional Judaism includes a legal system (Halacha) as an integral element of Judaism as a religion. Thus, the question of whether Judaism has dogmas in the sense of beliefs that must be accepted or affirmed is most importantly a Halachic, legal question.

In the Bible, in the plain meaning of Scripture, there is no command to believe in God – and, there are no commands to believe in the truth of any philosophic or theological proposition (such as Divine providence or Divine revelation). Maimonides based the first principle of his “13 Principles” of the existence of God on the Biblical verse “I am the Lord, your God” (Exodus 20, 2). However, this is not the plain meaning of the verse as the verse is not a commandment demanding belief in the existence of God – rather, the verse is a declaration (by God) in which God is presented as the God of the people Israel. In the Talmudic tradition, the commandments of Torah as a basis of Jewish law are only of doing and not doing (mitzvot aseh and lo ta’aseh), and not of believing or not believing.

Thus, in the Bible (in the plain meaning of Scripture) and in the Talmudic tradition, there are no commandments and no legal requirement to accept or affirm the truth of any philosophic or theological belief – and, beliefs in both the Bible and Talmudic tradition may be of central importance but do not have the status of a formal dogma that must be accepted or affirmed from a legal point of view. Indeed, it is only Maimonides in the Jewish tradition, in the medieval period, who codifies a binding dogma from a formal, legal point of view in codifying his “13 Principles” in his law code. Other medieval formulations of principles of belief of Judaism (such as those of Rabbi Sa’adya Gaon and Rabbi Yosef Albo) were not codifications in a formal, legal framework but merely formulations from a philosophic point of view of beliefs that Judaism assumes or that characterize Judaism.

It is possible to define the term dogma as an authoritative or obligatory belief not in a formal sense from a legal point of view, but in an informal sense from a philosophic point of view (beliefs that Judaism assumes or presupposes), such as in the case of medieval Jewish thinkers (Rabbi Sa’adya Gaon and Rabbi Yosef Albo) that I just cited – and, as in the case of Christianity in which belief in God and belief in Jesus as the messiah have the status of a dogma in the sense of beliefs that must be accepted or affirmed in order to be a true Christian (even though there is no legal system as a part of Christianity requiring such belief from a formal, legal point of view). In this regard, there is a fundamental difference between Judaism and Christianity as religions – Christianity as a religion presupposes belief in God (and in Jesus as the messiah), while traditional Judaism as a religion, based upon the Bible and Talmudic tradition, does not presuppose belief in God. In my eyes, Maimonides’ codification of a binding theological dogma as well as medieval formulations of theological beliefs that Judaism (allegedly) assumes or presupposes (such as those of Rabbi Sa’adya Gaon and Rabbi Yosef Albo) are a Christianization of traditional Judaism.

Traditional Judaism is a religion in a completely different sense than Christianity. Christianity is a religion in the orthodox (correct doctrine) sense of a faith commitment – faith not just in God but in Jesus as the messiah. There are in Christianity different streams (orthodox, catholic and protestant) and many different approaches within each stream, but what defines one as a Christian, and unites Christians, is the fundamental faith commitment in Jesus as the messiah. Christianity is a community of believers, and one who lacks the fundamental faith commitment in Jesus as the messiah is not a true Christian even if born of Christian parents. That is, in principle there can be no such thing as a secular, non-believing Christian – and, belief is thus of the very essence of Christianity as a religion.

By contrast, traditional Judaism is a religion not in the sense of a faith commitment but in the orthoprax (correct practice) sense of a culture and way of life of the Jewish people – not faith in God nor any other faith commitment defines one as a Jew, and among the Jewish people there are those who define themselves as religious and those who define themselves as secular. There are in Judaism different streams (orthodox, conservative, reconstructionist, reform and secular) and different approaches within each stream, but what defines one as a Jew is being born to a Jewish mother or having converted – and what unites Jews is not a faith commitment nor a traditional life of observance of law and ritual but being part of a people with a shared history, language (Hebrew), homeland (Israel) and culture or way of life (and in speaking of Judaism as a culture I am speaking not only of a traditional life of observance of law and ritual but also secular Jewish culture, such as Israeli folk dancing, which is not a part of traditional Jewish law or ritual but is an expression of a larger Jewish culture).

Belief is an important part of Jewish culture, but not of the essence of Jewish culture – and, not of the essence of a religious life in the Biblical and Talmudic conceptions. The Biblical and Talmudic conceptions of religion do not presuppose the existence of God or belief in God (indicating that belief in God, even though a central belief of Judaism, is not of the essence of Judaism).

In my eyes, the authentic nature of the ancient Jewish tradition based upon the Bible and Talmudic tradition is not orthodox (correct doctrine) as is widely believed (mistakenly, in my view) – and, orthodoxy in the Jewish tradition (and the notion that Judaism has dogmas) is a later historical development beginning only in the medieval period. The authentic nature of the Jewish tradition based upon the Bible and Talmudic tradition is orthoprax (correct practice) in the anti-theological sense of demanding right behavior (ethically and ritually) but no theological dogmas either in a formal, legal sense of commandments or in an informal, philosophic sense of presuppositions necessary in order to live a religious life.

The Biblical conception of religion

The Biblical conception of Judaism as a religion is reflected in a remarkable verse that stands out in the Bible in which the Bible defines Judaism not as a faith commitment but in an anti-theological sense as a heritage or culture (Deuteronomy 33, 4) – “Moses commanded us Torah, a heritage of the community of Jacob”. Strikingly, God is omitted from the verse, and it does not say that God has commanded us Torah through Moses – indicating that belief in God is not a necessary presupposition in order to live a life of Torah.

Most importantly, the essence of religion in the Biblical conception is conceived in an anti-theological sense of a moral life. The essence of religion in the Biblical conception is not faith in God, or observance of law and ritual practice, but a moral life of righteousness and goodness, as reflected in the Biblical verse (Deuteronomy 6, 18) – “you shall do that which is righteous and good in the eyes of the Lord”. The previous verse (Deuteronomy 6, 17) speaks of observance of commandments in a legal sense so that the verse “you shall do that which is righteous and good in the eyes of the Lord” is a moral demand above and beyond law – and, the emphasis is upon doing (deeds) and not believing (theology). Although the phrase “in the eyes of the Lord” implies that the concept of God is a central concept of the Bible, nevertheless the verse “you shall do that which is righteous and good in the eyes of the Lord” does not presuppose belief in God – and, a devout believer (and also one who lives an observant lifestyle of law and ritual) may live an immoral life and not “do that which is righteous and good in the eyes of the Lord”, while a devout atheist (and also one who does not live an observant lifestyle of law and ritual) may live a righteous life and “do that which is righteous and good in the eyes of the Lord”.

The Biblical name of the Jewish people, Israel (ישראל), in Hebrew contains the word God (אל) as well as the word righteous (ישר), the very same word righteous as in the verse “you shall do that which is righteous and good in the eyes of the Lord” – and, if the name Israel is divided in the middle, it means righteous of God (ישר אל). The people Israel are to be a people devoted to righteousness and right living as the essence of Judaism – and, even though a life of righteousness is seen as reflecting the will of God in the Biblical conception, nonetheless the essence of a religious life in the Biblical conception is not belief in God but a moral life of righteousness.

Also, Abraham, the spiritual father of the Jewish people is singled out as a person who “will keep the way of the Lord to do righteousness and justice” (Genesis 18, 19) – and, even though the term righteousness regarding Abraham is not the same word righteous that is found in the Biblical name of the Jewish people, Israel, it is a synonym. In the Biblical conception, “the way of the Lord” is a moral life of righteousness and justice as the essence of religion in which the emphasis is upon doing (deeds) and not believing (theology). The Biblical concept of “keeping the way of the Lord” does not presuppose belief in God – and, a devout believer (and also one who lives an observant lifestyle of law and ritual) may live an immoral life and not “keep the way of the Lord”, while a devout atheist (and also one who does not live an observant lifestyle of law and ritual) may live a righteous life and “keep the way of the Lord”.

A central religious concept of the Bible is the concept of fear of God – “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you, but to fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 10, 12). In the plain meaning of Scripture, the concept of fear of God is a moral concept and not a theological concept, as reflected in the Book of Proverbs (Proverbs 8, 13) – “fear of God is the hatred of evil”. Notice that the anti-theological definition (hatred of evil) given here by the Book of Proverbs of the concept of fear of God, in spite of the religious language of the Bible (fear of God), does not in any way presuppose belief in God – and, a devout believer (and also one who lives an observant lifestyle of law and ritual) may not have a hatred of evil and may live an immoral life (revealing a lack of “fear of God” in the religious terminology of the Bible), and a devout atheist (and also one who does not live an observant lifestyle of law and ritual) may hate evil and live a moral life (displaying “fear of God” in the religious terminology of the Bible).

The Biblical concept of faith is not a theological concept but a pragmatic concept. The Biblical term “emunah” that is often mistakenly translated and misunderstood as faith or belief in a theological sense is a moral character trait of the heart meaning faithfulness, loyalty or trust. The Bible is absent of any notion of faith or belief in a philosophic or theological sense of affirming the truth of philosophic propositions such as the existence or providence of God. In Biblical Hebrew the word emunah (אמונה) is from the same root as the Hebrew word art (אומנות) – indicating that Biblical faith is of the heart (like art). Emunah in the Biblical conception is not of the rational mind in an intellectual sense of beliefs, opinions or thoughts – rather, emunah is a concept of the heart in the sense of a moral character trait of faithfulness, loyalty or trust. For example, in the case of the Biblical verse (Genesis 15, 6) regarding Abraham “And he believed in the Lord, and it was counted to him for righteousness” where the context is that God has promised Abraham that he will have a son who will continue his lineage, Abraham is not affirming that God exists or is provident, but is expressing his own trust in God to fulfill the promise made to him. The verse tells us nothing whatsoever as to whether God actually exists or is truly provident – and, the verse tells us nothing about Abraham’s theological beliefs. The verse is revealing Abraham’s moral character (and nothing about the existence or nature of God, and nothing about Abraham’s theology), as indicated in the continuation of the verse, in which Abraham’s faith is “counted to him for righteousness”. If the verse was describing the faith of Abraham in a theological sense (of the rational mind), then his faith would be counted to him as knowledge and not righteousness. Abraham’s faith is an expression of his moral character and righteousness – and, the verse “And he believed in the Lord” is an expression of Abraham’s optimistic attitude of hope and trust, and his refusal to despair (in not having children), revealing his righteous character as a person.

The Bible is absent of any theological propositions that must be accepted or affirmed (such as the existence or providence of God), absent of any theological analysis of theological propositions and absent of any theological argument to demonstrate the truth of theological propositions. Belief in God is a central religious concept in the Bible only in the sense of a moral character trait of the heart – and, therefore, the concept of belief in God cannot have the status in the Bible of a theological dogma. The Biblical conception of religion then does not presuppose belief in God in a theological sense. The religious concern of the Bible is an orthoprax (deeds) concern with behavior – and, not an orthodox (doctrine) concern with correct theological belief. In the Biblical conception whether one is considered truly religious is revealed not in theological declarations or beliefs but in behavior – whether moral or immoral.

The Talmudic conception of religion

The Talmudic rabbis did not codify any formal, theological dogma or set of beliefs that must be accepted or affirmed from a legal point of view. I repeat and emphasize that the commandments of Torah as a basis of Jewish law, in the Talmudic tradition, are only of doing and not doing (mitzvot aseh and lo ta’aseh), and not of believing or not believing. Further, belief in God in the Talmudic tradition is not a dogma in the informal, philosophic sense of a presupposition necessary to live a religious life (and, this is true of belief in Divine revelation as well).

The two greatest Talmudic rabbis were Hillel and Rabbi Akiva who both formulated the essence of Judaism not as faith in God, and not as observance of law and ritual, but as universal, moral decency. As the essence of Judaism, Hillel pointed to the moral principle “what is hateful unto you do not do unto others” and Rabbi Akiva cited the Biblical verse (Leviticus 19, 18) “love your neighbor as yourself”. It is simply astounding to me that people whether of a religious or secular background do not notice how shocking their formulations are – their formulations of what it means to be religious are anti-theological in omitting God. This is even more striking in the case of Rabbi Akiva because the continuation of the Biblical verse that he cites is “I am the Lord”. Rabbi Akiva quotes only the beginning of the verse “love your neighbor as yourself” in arguing that the essence of Judaism is universal, moral decency. Hillel does not even cite a verse from the Bible in arguing that the essence of Judaism is universal, moral decency simply on the basis of one’s own conscience and experience – “what is hateful unto you do not do unto others”. The teachings of Hillel and Rabbi Akiva, faithful to the Biblical conception, do not presuppose belief in God – and, a devout believer (and also one who lives an observant lifestyle of law and ritual) may violate the teachings “what is hateful unto you do not do unto others” and “love your neighbor as yourself”, while a devout atheist (and also one who does not live an observant lifestyle of law and ritual) may fulfill the teachings “what is hateful unto you do not do unto others” and “love your neighbor as yourself”.

I want to cite a remarkable Talmudic source that directly relates to atheism and the denial of God – a midrash (rabbinic commentary on a Biblical verse):

It is written “they have abandoned Me and have not observed My Torah” (Jeremiah 16, 11) – “if only Me they would abandon but My Torah they would observe”, for by being involved (through study and observance) with it (the Torah) the light within it will return them to the right way.

The midrash consists of two parts. In the first part (“if only Me they would abandon but My Torah they would observe”), God declares that it would be better to abandon God (not to believe in God) but to observe the Torah (implying that more important than faith in God is good deeds). Thus, the midrash is initially expressing a pragmatic conception that the essence of Judaism is good deeds rather than faith in God – in dealing with people who don’t believe in God and live an immoral life. In the second part of the midrash, the midrash expresses the view that faith in God is the essence of a religious life – for, by being involved with Torah (the study and observance of Torah) people who do not believe in God will return to the right way of faith in God. It is clear that the term “right way” is referring to faith in God – as the situation is not ideal in the first part of the midrash in which faith is lacking when God says (“if only Me they would abandon but My Torah they would observe”.

The midrash then is paradoxical as the first part implies that good deeds are more important than faith in God, while the second part implies that faith in God (as the ultimate end of a religious life) is more important than good deeds. There is no contradiction, though, as the midrash holds that ideally, as expressed in the second part, faith in God, rather than good deeds, is the ultimate end of a religious life – and, in the first part, in the unfortunate and actual situation where one is forced to choose between faith and good deeds, it is good deeds that take precedence (just as in the case of an unhealthy person physically and mentally or emotionally, the health of the body will take precedence over that of the mind only because physical health is a more urgent matter than mental or emotional health).

The orthoprax (pragmatic) conception of the midrash, in which there is no hint that one who denies God is considered a heretic, is in contradistinction to the orthodox (correct doctrine) conception reflected in Maimonides’ codification of a formal, binding dogma – according to which one who denies the existence of God is a heretic. Moreover, the midrash clearly does not presuppose belief in God even in an informal, philosophic sense of a dogma necessary to live a religious life. Regarding one who does not believe in God but lives a life of Torah (good deeds), the midrash expresses an attitude of tolerance and optimism in that through study and observance of Torah such a person will ultimately come to faith in God. But, if not, and this person does not come to faith in God, there is no hint in the midrash that this person who does not believe in God but lives a moral life is a heretic even though according to the midrash faith in God is the essence of religion.

I want to cite a Talmudic source relating to the concept of Divine revelation – “Moses received Torah from Sinai” (Pirkei Avot 1, 1).  Strikingly, this Talmudic teaching omits God, and does not say that Moses received Torah from God on Sinai – and, is thus faithful to the anti-theological formulation of the Bible “Moses commanded us Torah, a heritage of the community of Jacob” that I previously cited. In my view, such an anti-theological Talmudic formulation allows for pluralism. It allows one who believes that the Torah is Divinely revealed to understand that Moses received Torah from God on Sinai (even though not written explicitly in the teaching) – and, it allows one who does not believe that the Torah is Divinely revealed (at least in a literal sense) to understand that Torah is a product of the historical experience of the Jewish people (symbolized by Moses and Sinai). It is  clear from the anti-theological formulation of the teaching “Moses received Torah from Sinai” that belief in Divine revelation does not have the status in the Talmudic tradition of a dogma either in a formal, legal sense of a commandment or in an informal, philosophic sense of a presupposition necessary in order to live a religious life.

In my view, the strongest and clearest piece of evidence that the Talmudic rabbis did not codify any formal dogma from a legal point of view, and that belief in God in the Talmudic tradition is not a dogma in the informal, philosophic sense of a presupposition necessary to live a religious life, is a source in the Talmud relating to the conversion process. There is no mention in the source of acceptance of theological principles as a requirement of a potential convert in becoming a member of the Jewish people – and, if Judaism did require the acceptance of philosophic or theological beliefs, then surely a potential convert would need to be notified of this in this source relating to the conversion process (Yevamot 47a):

Our rabbis taught: If at the present time a potential convert comes to convert, he is told: What reason do you have that you have come to convert? Do you not know that Israel at the present time are persecuted and oppressed, despised, harassed and overcome by afflictions? If he replies, I know and yet am unworthy, he is accepted immediately, and is informed of some of the minor and some of the major commandments…He is also informed of the punishment of the commandments…And just as he is informed of the punishment of the commandments, so is he informed of their reward.

Reflected in this Talmudic source is an orthoprax conception of Judaism. There are two things that are fundamental in this source regarding the conversion process. First, the potential convert is warned that he or she is becoming a member of an oppressed and persecuted people. Second, the potential convert is taught about some of the more important and less important commandments, and their reward and punishment. According to the orthoprax conception reflected in this source, Judaism is a way of life (involving observance of commandments) of the Jewish people. Conspicuously absent from the source is any mention of philosophic principles that one must accept.

Maimonides in his law code (laws of forbidden relations 14, 1-3) codifies this Talmudic source, and to a great extent quotes from it word for word with the glaring exception of several highly significant additions that he inserts that are not to be found in the original Talmudic source – and I have highlighted these significant additions:

How do we accept righteous converts? When he comes to convert, and he is investigated and no ulterior motive is found, he is told: What reason do you have that you have come to convert? Do you not know that Israel at the present time are persecuted and oppressed, despised, harassed and overcome by afflictions? If he replies, I know and yet am unworthy, he is accepted immediately. And, he is informed of the principles of the religion, which are the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and we elaborate upon this at great length. And he is informed of some of the minor and some of the major commandments, but we do not dwell upon this at length…And he is informed of the punishment of the commandments…And just as he is informed of the punishment of the commandments, so is he informed of their reward.

The most important thing that Maimonides adds is that the potential convert is to be taught principles of faith – he also adds that we are to elaborate at length in teaching principles of faith and that we do not elaborate at length in teaching about observance of commandments. Maimonides thus turns the Talmudic source upside down in transforming and distorting it from an orthoprax into an orthodox source. Maimonides transforms and distorts the conversion process from an orthoprax and pragmatic process of becoming a member of the Jewish people and taking upon oneself the traditional Jewish way of life (involving observance of commandments) into an orthodox and theological matter. It is clear from the Talmudic source that the Talmudic rabbis did not codify principles of faith as a binding dogma (like Maimonides) – for, if they had, it would have been necessary to inform a potential convert that such principles are an essential element of Judaism. Maimonides, in inventing the orthodox notion of Judaism requiring principles of belief as a binding dogma, is forced to distort the Talmudic source by inserting that a potential convert is to be informed of the principles of faith that Judaism allegedly (and falsely) requires.

My response to Rabbi Marc B. Shapiro

Rabbi Shapiro cites a Talmudic source from the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1) as a support for his view that Judaism does have dogmas – and, Maimonides attempted to base his codification of his “13 Principles of Faith” as a binding dogma upon this source. I want to discuss this source in some depth because, in my view, the source is widely misunderstood as a support for Maimonides codification of a binding dogma and for the idea that Judaism has dogmas (Sanhedrin 10, 1):

All of Israel have a share in the world to come…But the following have no share in the world to come: One who says that the revival of the dead is not from the Torah, that the Torah is not Divinely revealed, and a heretic. Rabbi Akiva says also one who reads external (apocryphal) literature, and one who attempts to cure with charms…Abba Saul said also one who pronounces the holy name as spelled.

I want to point out several things in relation to this source in order to make clear that there is no precedent at all in this source for the codifying of a binding dogma by Maimonides – and, no support for the view of Rabbi Shapiro that Judaism has dogmas.

First, the term that is translated heretic (apikorus) is a Greek or Aramaic term – however, according to the Talmud, and according to Maimonides as well, the term does not refer to theological heresy (the denying of a philosophic proposition) but characteristic of the orthoprax and pragmatic nature of the Jewish tradition refers to heresy in a behavioral sense of scorning or deriding Torah (the Jewish tradition) or a Torah scholar (as an authoritative interpreter of Torah).

I want to elaborate at some length here regarding the Talmudic notion of heresy.

In the Talmud, there is no notion of theological heresy as the Talmudic rabbis did not codify any binding theological dogma. Heresy in the Talmudic conception is not a theological (orthodox) but a behavioral (orthoprax) concept – according to which even deviant ritual behavior, such as the eating of a non-kosher, forbidden piece of meat, may be regarded as heresy. Whether the eating of a non-kosher, forbidden piece of meat constitutes heresy or not depends upon the circumstances and intention involved. If one eats the non-kosher, forbidden piece of meat merely because it is tasty (לתיאבון) and one cannot control one’s impulses, then the act is in no way considered heresy, but is simply a violation of the dietary laws of the Torah. Such an act is considered to be an act of wrongdoing (legally), but not heresy. However, if one eats the non-kosher, forbidden piece of meat as an act of scorn or derision (להכעיס), then the act is considered to be heretical.

Rabbi Abraham Kook (who lived in the early 20^th century) came to the defense of a rabbi who was accused of theological heresy, and Rabbi Kook cited a remarkable Talmudic source (Shevuot 26a):

What is an example of such a case (of the taking of an oath against one’s will)? It is as in the incident of Rav Kahane and Rav Asi, who had been standing before Rav. One took an oath that this was the statement of Rav and the other took an oath that this was the statement of Rav. When they came before Rav they established his statement (of Rav) in accordance with one of them (Rav Kahane or Rav Asi). The other said to him (Rav): ‘I have therefore sworn falsely’.  Rav replied to him: ‘Your heart forced (compelled) you’.

The case here is one in which two rabbis, Rav Kahane and Rav Asi, hear a statement of their teacher, Rav – and, each (Rav Kahane and Rav Asi) has a different understanding or memory of what Rav said. Each swears an oath that Rav’s statement was according to his understanding or memory. They verify with Rav that one of them understood or remembered correctly – and, the one who understood or remembered incorrectly asks Rav what he is to do given that he has sworn an oath falsely, in violation of the Torah. Rav, in saying that he had been forced by his heart, is implying that there is no wrongdoing (legally or morally) and he is thus exempt from any punishment.

In my opinion, Rabbi Kook cited this source in order to make clear a fundamental difference between behavior and belief – deviant behavior is subject to regulation and punishment, while belief (even deviant) is a matter of conviction and thus not subject to punishment. Regarding behavior, I repeat that according to the Talmud if one eats a non-kosher, forbidden piece of meat not as an act of scorn or derision, but because it is tasty and one cannot control one’s impulses, then the act is not to be regarded as heresy. However, the act of eating the forbidden meat is nonetheless regarded as an act of wrongdoing (legally) and a violation of the Jewish law – and the person is in no way exempt from punishment because he or she could not control his or her impulses. A person is expected to control one’s impulses. By contrast, in the case of “wrong” belief, in the Talmudic source cited by Rabbi Kook, Rav is arguing that the rabbi who mistakenly believed as a matter of conviction with all of his heart (“your heart forced you”) that he understood or heard Rav correctly is not guilty of any wrongdoing whatsoever (legally or morally), and is entirely exempt from punishment. Such a person may be considered mistaken or wrong from a factual point of view (in not understanding or hearing correctly), but there is no wrongdoing either in a formal, legal sense of a violation of law or in a moral sense.

Maimonides, as I earlier pointed out, was well aware that there was no precedent in the Jewish tradition for his codifying principles of belief as a binding theological dogma (as the commandments of Torah are only of doing and not doing) – and, Maimonides was aware that such a binding dogma is a violation of a Talmudic legal principle that decisions of law are not to be rendered regarding issues of abstract, philosophic belief that do not touch upon behavior. Maimonides formulates this Talmudic principle in his work the Commentary to the Mishnah several times including shortly after presenting his “13 Principles of Faith” (Sanhedrin 10, 3) – “every dispute that arises between rabbis that has no practical implications regarding behavior, but is only a matter of belief, there is no room for rendering a Halachic (legal) decision in accordance with one or another”.

The Talmudic principle that Maimonides formulates is an orthoprax principle – as according to the principle, Jewish law regulates only behavior, and does not regulate abstract, philosophic or theological belief that has no practical implications regarding behavior. That is, the implications of this orthoprax principle are that there is freedom of belief within a legal framework regulating only behavior and not belief.

Regarding behavior, when there is a legal dispute between two rabbinic authorities, in which there are two contradictory opinions, the dispute must be resolved in order to know how we are to act – for we cannot accept both opinions (in terms of behavior) and act in two contradictory ways. However, regarding abstract, philosophic thought, when there is a dispute between two authorities (or between two people), in which there are two contradictory philosophic opinions, there is no necessary reason to resolve the dispute of an abstract nature, since we may accept, and even appreciate and encourage (in broadening horizons), contradictory philosophic opinions.

An example of a belief that does touch upon behavior and regarding which a decision of law must be rendered is whether chicken is to be considered meat for the purpose of dietary laws. Obviously, a legal decision must be rendered whether chicken is meat in order that traditional Jews will know whether chicken can be cooked and eaten together with milk. Maimonides’ “13 Principles of Faith” are all of them matters of abstract, philosophic thought completely divorced from behavior. For example, regarding belief in the existence of God, there is no necessary reason whatsoever from the point of view of the Jewish law that a decision must be rendered whether God exists or not. Such an abstract, philosophic question does not directly touch upon any behavior. It is possible that one may believe that God exists and yet act in an evil way – conversely, one may believe that God does not exist and yet act in a righteous way. It is possible that one may believe that God exists and yet not observe a traditional framework of Jewish law and Jewish ritual practice – conversely, one may believe that God does not exist and yet observe a traditional framework of Jewish law and Jewish ritual practice as an expression of Jewish identity and culture (observing commandments of the Torah not as commandments of God but as commandments of the Torah or Jewish tradition).

The Talmudic rabbis did not formulate this orthoprax, legal principle that decisions of law are not to be rendered regarding issues of abstract belief. Maimonides formulates the principle on the basis of the Talmud – as, in point of fact, the Talmud does not render decisions of law regarding issues of belief that do not touch upon behavior. An example is a passage in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 99a) in which Rabbi Hillel says that the messiah will not come (and this is not Hillel the great teacher who taught “what is hateful unto you do not do unto others”, but a minor Talmudic figure). The Talmud brings the opinion of Rabbi Hillel together with that of Rav Joseph who prays that God will forgive Rabbi Hillel implying that Rabbi Hillel has sinned in the view of Rav Joseph. This raises a philosophic and legal question whether the term sin applies to abstract thought or belief – as the Jewish law on the basis of the Talmud is pragmatic regulating behavior and not thought or belief. If so, what then according to Rav Joseph is the sin of Rabbi Hillel? Rashi (the great commentator of the 11^th century) interprets that the intention of Rav Joseph is merely that Rabbi Hillel has said something which is not true. That is, according to Rashi (who is in his interpretation faithful to the pragmatic nature of Jewish law regulating behavior and not belief), Rav Joseph is saying that Rabbi Hillel “sinned” merely in the sense of being mistaken in his belief (in the opinion of Rav Joseph) – however, most significantly, according to Rashi, Rav Joseph is not saying that Rabbi Hillel is a heretic. Moreover, the Talmud does not say that Rabbi Hillel is a heretic, and records the debate between Rabbi Hillel and Rav Joseph without rendering any legal decision as to who is correct faithful to the orthoprax and pragmatic nature of the Jewish law (reflected in the orthoprax, legal principle formulated by Maimonides) according to which decisions of law are not rendered regarding philosophic matters not touching upon behavior.

Therefore, Maimonides codified his “13 Principles of Faith” as a binding dogma in contradistinction to a Talmudic principle that he himself formulated – decisions of law are not to be rendered regarding issues of abstract belief. That is, on the one hand, Maimonides codifies a binding theological dogma reflecting an orthodox conception of Judaism – and, on the other hand, he formulates a Talmudic principle reflecting an orthoprax conception of Judaism. There is then a contradiction in the philosophic thought of Maimonides.

In my view, Maimonides’ true conception regarding Judaism as a thinker is orthoprax as reflected in the Talmudic principle that he formulated – and, as I earlier suggested, he codified a binding theological dogma creating an orthodox conception of Judaism as a political and religious leader of Jewish communities (and not as a thinker) only for the unlearned Jewish masses in order to strengthen them (as Christians and Moslems had codified principles of belief). If we accept the orthodox conception of Judaism created by Maimonides reflected in his “13 Principles” that Judaism requires principles of belief that must be accepted, we will be forced to regard Rabbi Hillel as well as other Talmudic thinkers who expressed views in contradistinction to Maimonides’ principles of faith as heretics even though the Talmud does not view them as heretics.

I also want to cite the Passover Haggadah in which the wicked son is defined as a heretic. The heresy of the wicked son is not that he does not believe in God (or some other theological proposition such as Divine revelation), or that he does not live an observant life of law and ritual, but that he has no sense of Jewish identity in asking “what is this service to you?”. The heresy of the wicked son, according to the Passover Haggadah, is that he scorns his people and heritage in viewing himself as outside the fold and not as a part of the Jewish people. I want to emphasize that the wicked son views himself as outside the fold – and, this is in sharp contradistinction to the widespread phenomenon throughout the contemporary orthodox world (modern orthodox and ultra-orthodox) of defining contemporary non-orthodox versions of Judaism as outside the fold of rabbinic Judaism. The contemporary non-orthodox versions of Judaism do not reject traditional, rabbinic Judaism, and they do not scorn the Jewish tradition. They do not define their versions of Judaism as non-rabbinic – rather, they view their versions of Judaism as historical development within the rabbinic tradition. They define their versions of Judaism as non-orthodox – and, non-orthodox versions of Judaism are an expression of the heart and conviction for non-orthodox Jews no less than an orthodox version of Judaism is an expression of the heart and conviction for orthodox Jews.

Incidentally, there is a Talmudic concept of “an infant that was captured” (תינוק שנשבה), which refers to inadvertent sin or wrongdoing due to ignorance about Judaism – as if the Jew who is technically guilty of sin or wrongdoing had been captured as an infant and raised without Jewish education. On a widespread basis in the orthodox world such a concept is applied to non-observant Jews who do not live a traditional lifestyle observant of Jewish law and Jewish ritual practice – in order not to define them as heretics. Although the motivation for applying such a Talmudic concept to contemporary non-observant Jews is positive (in order not to define them as heretics), nevertheless such a solution for not considering contemporary non-observant Jews as heretics is, in my eyes, insulting and condescending – especially regarding those non-observant Jews (even if they are a minority among non-observant Jews) who do not lack in basic Jewish education. Such a solution reflects an anti-democratic and anti-pluralistic approach that is widespread throughout the orthodox world – and, the underlying assumption of such a solution is that if such non-observant Jews did not lack basic Jewish education, then there would be no room in Judaism for a non-observant lifestyle and non-observant Jews would be defined as heretics outside the fold.

In my view, there is a solution on the basis of the Talmud for not considering contemporary non-observant Jews as heretics that is compatible with a democratic and pluralistic approach – and, does not reflect insult and condescension. We simply need to recognize that there is no basis in the Talmud for delegitimizing as heresy a non-observant way of life (not observant of Jewish law and Jewish ritual practice) unless we judge in a negative and unfavorable light that such a non-observant lifestyle arises out of scorn or derision (להכעיס) regarding Judaism. If we judge in a positive and favorable light that a non-observant lifestyle arises out of conviction of the heart, or is simply a comfortable lifestyle (לתיאבון) for so many non-observant Jews, then there is no basis in the Talmud for considering such a non-observant lifestyle heresy.

The Talmudic notion of heresy then is deviant behavior that is the result of scorn.

If we return to the source from the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1), which Maimonides bases his “13 Principles” upon as a binding dogma – I emphasize that the term heretic (apikorus) in this source is not a precedent for the codification of a binding theological dogma requiring acceptance of principles of belief even according to Maimonides’ own understanding of the term heretic in the source. In addition, the term heretic (apikorus) in the source is not a support for the view of Rabbi Shapiro that Judaism has dogmas – as the term heretic in the source is not a theological concept but a behavioral concept (deviant behavior that is the result of scorn or derision).

Second, the source from the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1) is not of a Halachic (legal) nature but is an Aggadic (moral, spiritual and philosophic) teaching. The source is completely absent of any legal language such as obligatory, permissible or forbidden. Furthermore, the source does not address a Halachic, legal question but an Aggadic, philosophic question of why a Jew is denied a share in the world to come. That is, the source is not an authoritative, legal source but merely a recording of various opinions concerning a philosophic issue of why a Jew is denied a share in the world to come. The evidence that this is so is that Rabbi Akiva suggests that a Jew is denied a share in the world to come by reading external literature, which means ancient Jewish books that were excluded from the canonization of the Hebrew Bible by the Talmudic rabbis – including the Book of Ben Sira, for example. The Talmud, which is a commentary upon the Mishnah quotes a number of times from the Book of Ben Sira, indicating that Rabbi Akiva’s opinion in the Mishnah apparently carries no formal, binding status for the Talmud – and the Halacha (Jewish law) is based upon authoritative precedent such that if this passage were legal in nature the Talmud would be bound by the Mishnah, as an earlier authoritative precedent. Thus, this source from the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1) does not (for the Talmudic rabbis) represent an authoritative, legal source but is merely a recording of various opinions as to why a Jew is denied a share in the world to come – and, the source then cannot serve as a precedent for the codification of a binding theological dogma by Maimonides.

Third, the source from the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1) does not speak about belief at all – rather, the beliefs that the revival of the dead is not from the Torah and that the Torah is not Divinely revealed are not to be professed in speech as reflected in the word “says” (“one who says…”). The source is a negative formulation of several beliefs that should not be professed in speech and several practices that should not be engaged in – constituting reasons why a Jew is denied a share in the world to come. Maimonides, by contrast, formulates in a positive sense theological principles in a comprehensive way (13 principles covering a wide range of theological topics) that a Jew must from a legal point of view accept or affirm as a matter of belief. This is clearly a leap from an orthoprax passage (concerning speech and practice) that expresses a philosophic opinion that one who professes certain beliefs, or engages in certain practices, is denied a share in the world to come to an orthodox formulation by Maimonides in a comprehensive way of theological principles that must be accepted as a matter of belief or to the inference of Rabbi Shapiro from this source that Judaism has theological dogmas that must be accepted.

Rabbi Shapiro’s interpretation of the Mishnah Sanhedrin 10, 1

Rabbi Shapiro understands (“The Limits of Orthodox Theology”, p. 30) that even though the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1) is teaching that the beliefs that the revival of the dead is not from the Torah and that the Torah is not Divinely revealed are not to be professed in speech as reflected in the word “says” (“one who says…”) – nonetheless, the Mishnah is assuming that these beliefs are dogmas that must be accepted or affirmed. The Mishnah, according to Rabbi Shapiro, lists these two beliefs because apparently in relation to these beliefs there was dispute, thereby explaining why belief in God does not appear in the Mishnah. There are, however, several problems with this interpretation of Rabbi Shapiro.

First, Rabbi Shapiro infers (mistakenly, in my eyes) that even though belief in God does not appear in the Mishnah nonetheless it was a dogma that must be accepted and affirmed in the Talmudic tradition. But, even regarding the two beliefs that the revival of the dead is not from the Torah and that the Torah is not Divinely revealed, the Mishnah does not present these beliefs as dogmas that must be accepted or affirmed. Rather, the Mishnah merely presents a philosophic opinion that one who professes such beliefs in speech is denied a share in the world to come. As I just previously pointed out, this is clearly a leap from a passage that expresses a philosophic opinion that one who professes such beliefs in speech is denied a share in the world to come to an inference that these beliefs are dogmas.

Moreover, in light of the midrash that I previously cited in which God says “if only Me they would abandon but My Torah they would observe”, belief in God is not a dogma in the Talmudic tradition that must be accepted and affirmed – and, even belief in Divine revelation, which does appear in the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1), is not a dogma in the Talmudic tradition that must be accepted and affirmed in light of the Talmudic teaching that I previously cited “Moses received Torah from Sinai” (and, it is not written from God on Sinai). Both sources clearly contradict the inference by Rabbi Shapiro from the Mishnah that Judaism has dogmas such as belief in God and belief in Divine revelation. Most important, though, it is very clear from the Talmudic source (Yevamot 47a) that I cited relating to conversion that there are no dogmas in the Talmudic tradition (including belief in God) – for, if there were dogmas in the Talmudic tradition, it would have been necessary to inform a potential convert that such principles of belief are an essential element of Judaism.

Second, Rabbi Shapiro assumes (mistakenly, in my eyes) that the use of the term “says” in the Mishnah (“one who says”) is not significant – and, thus, the beliefs that revival of the dead is not from the Torah and that the Torah is not Divinely revealed are dogmas that must be accepted and affirmed. By the way, Maimonides, in his codification of theological heresy in his law code (laws of tshuva, 3, 7), uses language faithful to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1) in listing various theological heretics – “one who says that there is no God and no Ruler of the world” or “one who says that there is a Ruler, but they are two or more” and so on. In the case of Maimonides’ codification of theological heresy, Maimonides’ use of the term “says” rather than “believes” in relation to theological heretics is indeed not significant – as his use of the term “says” is in the context of his codification of theological heresy indicating that he is concerned with improper theological belief (and, not improper speech). However, in the case of the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1) this is not so (and, the term “says” is very significant) – as the notion of theological heresy is completely absent from the Talmudic tradition. I previously indicated that the Talmudic notion of heresy is behavioral and not theological – and, thus, the use of the term “says” in the Mishnah is very significant as the Mishnah is concerned not with theology but with behavior (speech and practices).

Third, the two beliefs listed in the Mishnah that revival of the dead is not from the Torah and that the Torah is not Divinely revealed were indeed subject to ideological and political dispute in the early Talmudic (Mishnaic) period. These two beliefs were at the center of the ideological and political dispute between the Pharisees and Sadducees.

The terms Pharisees and Sadducees took on a negative connotation due to Christianity, but both the Pharisees and Sadducees were Jewish sects during the early Talmudic (Mishnaic) period. The source of the disputes between the Pharisees and the Sadducees concerned the Talmudic methodology of midrashic interpretation – of interpreting Biblical texts beyond their plain meaning. The Pharisees were a sect that was in the main led by scribes and teachers – and, the Talmudic rabbis were ideological descendants of the Pharisees (and, the Talmudic term rabbi means teacher). The Pharisees distinguished between a Written Torah (Scripture) and an Oral Torah (interpretation of Scripture). The Pharisees and the Talmudic rabbis, in living according to the Written Torah (Scripture) as interpreted by the Oral Torah (rabbinic tradition), used midrashic interpretation in a systematic way in elaborating and expanding upon the Written Torah. Most of the teachings of the Oral Torah (rabbinic tradition) – Halachic, legal teachings and Aggadic (moral, spiritual and philosophic) teachings – are midrashic teachings (elaborations), and not the plain meaning of Scripture. The Sadducees, by contrast, were a priestly sect, and most of the ancient, hereditary priesthood in the early Talmudic (Mishnaic) period were Sadducees. The Sadducees objected to the methodology of midrashic interpretation – and, rejected the Oral Torah of the Pharisees and Talmudic rabbis in attempting to live according to what is written explicitly in Scripture (the Written Torah). The Sadducees disappeared with the destruction of the ancient Temple in Jerusalem by the Romans – the Temple being the institutional center of the priestly cult.

In the early Talmudic (Mishnaic) period there was a political struggle for leadership of the Jewish people between the Sadducees and the Pharisees. In the plain meaning of Scripture, priests and priestly functions were clearly of central importance in the Biblical literature. In the plain meaning of Scripture, the priests were the institutional religious leaders of the Jewish people – “If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment… And thou shall come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days; and thou shalt inquire; and they shall declare unto thee the sentence of judgment…according to the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do” (Deuteronomy 17, 8-11). In the plain meaning of Scripture the authority to teach law and adjudicate legal matters is given to priests and to judges – but, judges in the plain meaning of Scripture refers to political and military leaders (as reflected in the Book of Judges), and not to rabbis (and, there is no term rabbi in the plain meaning of Scripture). Yet, the Talmudic rabbis midrashically interpreted these verses not according to their plain meaning as giving authority to teach law and adjudicate legal matters to rabbis.

If we return to the two beliefs cited in the source from the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10, 1) that revival of the dead is not from the Torah and that the Torah is not Divinely revealed – these two beliefs were, as I pointed out, at the center of the ideological and political dispute between the Pharisees and Sadducees. The Sadducees argued that the concept of the revival of the dead is not found in the plain meaning of Scripture and thus not from the Torah – and, they rejected the Talmudic notion of an Oral Torah thus denying that the Oral Torah is Divinely revealed. The background then to the Mishnah in suggesting that the beliefs that the revival of the dead is not from the Torah and that the Torah is not Divinely revealed are not to be professed in speech is not theological but political – and, the concern of the Mishnah is not with theological belief but with speech (behavior) undermining the authority of the Talmudic rabbis as the leaders of the Jewish people (and, belief in God does not appear in the Mishnah, as such a belief was not a matter of dispute between Pharisees and Sadducees).

I also want to emphasize that the Talmudic rabbis defined the Sadducees as heretics and outside the fold of the rabbinic tradition only on the basis of the self-definition of the Sadducees (in rejecting the rabbinic tradition) – in contradistinction to the widespread phenomenon throughout the contemporary orthodox world (modern orthodox and ultra-orthodox) of defining contemporary non-orthodox versions of Judaism as outside the fold of rabbinic Judaism in spite of the self-definition of non-orthodox versions of Judaism (who reject orthodoxy and not the rabbinic tradition). The Sadducees rejected and scorned the rabbinic tradition thus defining themselves as outside the fold of the rabbinic tradition (as in the case of the wicked son of the Passover Haggadah who defined himself as outside the fold) – in contradistinction to contemporary non-orthodox versions of Judaism who do not reject traditional, rabbinic Judaism, and do not scorn their tradition, but merely reject an orthodox version of the rabbinic tradition.

Today in the orthodox world (modern orthodox and ultra-orthodox) there are on a widespread basis orthodox rabbis and leaders who refuse to serve in institutions together with non-orthodox rabbis and leaders. Even if I were to accept the claim, which I do not, that non-orthodox movements are outside of the rabbinic tradition like Sadducees, I point out – although the Sadducees were considered by the Talmudic rabbis to be a heretical sect in relation to the rabbinic tradition (the Oral Torah), and outside the fold of rabbinic Judaism, the Talmudic rabbis served together with Sadducees in the Sanhedrin (high court). I want to cite a Talmudic source that relates to the approach of the Talmudic rabbis to the Sadducees (Yoma 1, 5):

My master, High Priest, we are the messengers of the Beit Din (court), and you are our messenger and the messenger of the Beit Din (court). We make you swear, by He Who caused His name to dwell in this House, that you will not change a thing from what we have told you. He would separate from them and cry, and they would separate from him and cry.

The background to this source is that in the early Talmudic period when the Temple was still standing most of the priests who served in the Temple were Sadducees – and rabbis are speaking with the High Priest in this source on the eve of Yom Hakippurim. On Yom Hakippurim the high point of the Temple service is when the High Priest enters alone into the Holy of Holies, the most sacred part of the Temple, in performing a sacred ceremony. The problem is that there was disagreement between the Sadducees and the Pharisees (of whom the Talmudic rabbis were followers) regarding how to perform the ceremony in the Holy of Holies – and thus the rabbis here are worried that the High Priest may be a Sadducee and perform the ceremony not as the rabbis have taught him according to the practice of the Pharisees but according to the practice of the Sadducees (and no one can enter the Holy of Holies to check how the High Priest will perform the ceremony). The rabbis make the High Priest swear that he will perform the ceremony as they have taught him.

What stands out in this source is that even though the Sadducees were considered by the Talmudic rabbis to be a heretical sect in relation to the rabbinic tradition, and outside the fold of rabbinic Judaism, the rabbis do not demand of the High Priest who is suspected of being a Sadducee to change his philosophic conception of Judaism – and, the rabbis in this specific case merely find a technical solution of making the High Priest swear that he will perform the ceremony as they have taught him. Significantly, they do not make the High Priest swear that he is a Pharisee and not a Sadducee – and, they do not replace him with someone who they trust, or who has sworn, is a Pharisee. Implied is that if the High Priest is indeed a Sadducee, the rabbis are respectful, or at least tolerant, that the High Priest believes in the ideology of the Sadducees (and will remain a Sadducee even after performing the Temple service on Yom Hakippurim), and the rabbis insist in this specific case only regarding behavior that he perform the ceremony of Yom Hakippurim according to the practice of the Pharisees.

Concluding words

The question of whether Judaism has dogmas is, in my view, not merely an academic question. Maimonides’ codification of a binding dogma is the basis of an anti-democratic and anti-pluralistic approach originating in the medieval period that is widespread today throughout the orthodox world (modern orthodox and ultra-orthodox), which is characterized by a tendency to not only express disagreement but to delegitimize (and define as heretics outside the fold) those Jews who are not bound by orthodox dogma and ideology (and especially non-orthodox versions of Judaism). This tendency to delegitimize (and define as heretics outside the fold) on the basis of improper theological belief not only has no basis in the Talmudic tradition but leads to fragmentation of the Jewish people in violation of an express Halachic, legal teaching of the Talmudic rabbis that it is forbidden to divide the Jewish people into ideological factions (“לא תעשו אגודות, אגודות”) – and, this tendency in the orthodox world to delegitimize is not just regarding those outside the orthodox world but also regarding those who think differently within the orthodox world leading to fragmentation even within the orthodox world. This legal teaching is an expression of a fundamental principle of the Jewish tradition of the unity of the Jewish people – and, thus, it is forbidden to divide the Jewish people into ideological factions.

My cry as a teacher of Jewish studies is to return to our ancient, orthoprax heritage reflected in the Bible and the Talmudic tradition in which there is no dogma – and, according to the Talmudic tradition, the commandments of Torah as the basis of Jewish law are only of doing and not doing (mitzvot aseh and lo ta’aseh), and not of believing or not believing. An orthoprax conception (regulating only behavior and not belief) faithful to the Bible and Talmudic tradition allows not only for freedom of belief but also for the bridging of gaps between Jews of differing ideological orientations – and, for a democratic approach of pluralism, mutual respect and tolerance in the face of differing ideological orientations thereby preserving the unity of the Jewish people. An orthodox conception of Judaism requiring adherence to dogma leads to intolerance of those not bound by accepted orthodox dogma and ideology. My fight then as a teacher of Jewish studies is against the widespread intolerance that is rampant throughout the orthodox world (toward others within and outside of the orthodox world) threatening the unity of the Jewish people – and, such widespread intolerance is a direct result of the anti-democratic and anti-pluralistic approach that necessarily characterizes an orthodox (correct doctrine) conception of Judaism demanding adherence to orthodox dogma and ideology.