In the first part of this article, I want to distinguish between two fundamentally different conceptions of the holiness of the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) for we as Jews – one an orthodox (theological) conception and the other, by way of contrast an orthoprax (anti-theological) conception. The debate here concerns the philosophic issue of in what sense the Torah is to be considered for us as Jews a sacred document. In the second part of this article, I will cite, and analyze, a Talmudic precedent for an orthoprax (anti-theological) conception of the holiness and authority of the Torah.
An orthoprax as opposed to an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses)
The term orthodox literally means correct doctrine – and, this implies that the essence of religion is the acceptance of theological doctrines such as belief in the existence of God. In traditional Judaism, there is a mainstream and widespread orthodox conception in which the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) is viewed as sacred in an inherent sense, as literally reflecting the very word and will of God – and, this is an orthodox conception (in a literal sense of the term orthodox) because the conception is doctrinal in nature presupposing from a theological point of view the doctrine that God exists as well as the doctrine that the Torah is sacred from a metaphysical (and theological) point of view in reflecting the very word and will of God. It should be noticed that this conception is universal in nature – and, the holiness of the Torah is not dependent at all upon the Jewish people, Jewish history or Jewish culture but is inherent from a metaphysical point of view in the very nature of the Torah reflecting the word and will of God.
Such an orthodox and theological (doctrinal) conception of the holiness of the Torah reflects an orthodox and theological conception of Judaism as a religion – and, in my eyes, such an orthodox conception of Judaism actually represents an influence of Christianity and a Christianization of Judaism. There is a widespread belief that orthodox Judaism is authentic Judaism, and that traditional Judaism has always been orthodox – and, in my view, this is a misconception. Orthodoxy as an ideology emerges in traditional Judaism in the medieval period following the Talmudic period – and, the nature of the ancient Jewish tradition based upon the Hebrew Bible and Talmudic tradition is, in my view, orthoprax.
Christianity is in essence orthodox and universal in nature in that Christianity is a religion in the theological and doctrinal sense of a universal faith commitment. That is, the essence of Christianity is faith from a theological point of view not just in the existence of God but also more importantly in Jesus as the messiah – and, such faith is universal in nature as theological doctrine is a matter of universal reason.
What defines one as a Christian, and unites Christians is the fundamental theological belief in Jesus as the messiah. Christianity is a community of believers, and one who lacks this fundamental belief in Jesus as the messiah is not a true Christian even if born of Christian parents (and even if believing in the existence of God). In principle, there can be no such thing as a secular, non-believing Christian. The essence of Christianity as a religion is then a fundamental theological faith commitment characterized by belief in God and belief in Jesus as the messiah. Similarly, according to an orthodox conception of Judaism as a religion, the essence of Judaism is a fundamental theological faith commitment characterized by belief not only in the existence of God but also that the Torah reflects the very word and will of God.
The term orthoprax literally means correct practice – more broadly, though, the term means that the essence of religion is a pragmatic life of good deeds or right living in which there is no presupposition of the existence of God or of belief in the existence of God. Traditional Judaism (based upon the Hebrew Bible and Talmudic tradition) is a religion not in the orthodox sense of a theological faith commitment but in an orthoprax and pragmatic sense of a culture and way of life of the Jewish people, as reflected in the Biblical verse – “Moses commanded us Torah, a heritage of the community of Jacob” (Deuteronomy 33, 4). It should be noticed that the verse conceives of Torah not as universal in nature (and not as a matter of universal reason), but as a heritage of the Jewish people – and, also, strikingly, the verse conceives of Torah in an anti-theological sense in which the term God is even omitted from the verse (allowing atheists and agnostics to identify with the conception).
Not faith in God nor any other faith commitment defines one as a Jew, and among the Jewish people there are those who define themselves as religious and those who define themselves as secular. What defines one as a Jew is not a faith commitment, nor even a traditional life of observance of law and ritual, but being born to a Jewish mother or having converted. What unites Jews (and, a fundamental idea of Judaism is that we are to be united as one people) is not a faith commitment, nor a traditional life of observance of law and ritual, but being part of a people with a common heritage – a shared history, language (Hebrew), national homeland (Israel) and culture or way of life (and in speaking of Judaism as a culture I am not speaking of a traditional life of observance of law and ritual but of a larger Jewish culture including secular elements, such as Israeli folk dancing, which is not a part of traditional Jewish law or ritual but is an expression of a larger Jewish culture).
Thus, there are two elements of Judaism as a religion that are reflected in two central covenants of the Bible between God and the Jewish people (in the Biblical conception) – the covenant of Abraham and the covenant of Moses. The covenant of Abraham is the nationalistic element of Judaism, as Abraham in the Biblical conception is the spiritual father of the Jewish people or nation – and, Jewish peoplehood or nationhood is in a nationalistic sense (as from the beginning of Jewish history there have been Jews of differing ethnic and racial background, and anyone can convert to Judaism regardless of ethnic or racial background). The covenant of Moses is the religious-cultural element of Judaism, as Moses is the spiritual father of the Jewish religion-culture – and, the Jewish religion-culture is in the sense not of a faith commitment but of a way of life of the Jewish people.
To be a member of the Jewish people, and to share in the Jewish culture or heritage is very similar to being a member of the American people as a citizen of the United States, and sharing an American culture and heritage. In both cases, being a Jew and an American is a matter of belonging to a particular nation with a particular culture and way of life – and, not a matter of acceptance of any specific doctrines or teachings. In both cases, there are without question central ideas that characterize both the Jewish and American cultures, such as in the case of Judaism the ideas of the existence of God and of the holiness of the Torah, and in the case of the American culture the idea of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – however, in both cases, such central beliefs or ideas are central in characterizing the cultures, but those ideas do not have the status of dogma that must be accepted (and, there is no binding dogma or beliefs that must be accepted in the Hebrew Bible or in the Talmudic tradition as the foundation of traditional Judaism).
I will cite two Talmudic sources reflecting the orthoprax and pragmatic nature of the Talmudic tradition, one relating to belief in the existence of God, and the other relating to belief in the holiness of the Torah, to exemplify that such theological beliefs do not in the Talmudic tradition have the status of dogma that must be accepted.
In relation to belief in God, there is a Talmudic midrash (commentary) based upon a Biblical verse that attributes to God a striking statement that in effect it is better to be a moral atheist than an immoral believer in God (איכה רבה, פתיחה, סימן ב):
It is written (that God says) “they have abandoned Me and have not observed My Torah” (Jeremiah 16, 11) – “if only Me they would abandon but My Torah they would observe”, for by being involved (through study and observance) with it (the Torah) the light within it will return them to the right way.
The midrash consists of two parts. In the first part, God declares that it would be better not to believe in God (to abandon God) but to observe the Torah (“if only Me they would abandon but My Torah they would observe”) implying that more important than faith in God is good deeds. In this first part, the observance of Torah is in all likelihood referring to good deeds in a moral rather than ritual sense – for, if a person does not believe in God, it is unlikely (though not impossible) that such a person will observe ritual. So, the midrash is expressing an orthoprax and pragmatic conception that the essence of Judaism is good deeds in a moral sense rather than faith in God – in dealing with people who don’t believe in God and live an immoral life (“they have abandoned Me and have not observed My Torah”). In the second part of the midrash, the midrash expresses the view that faith in God is the essence of a religious life – for, by being involved with Torah (the study and observance of Torah) people who do not believe in God will return to the right way of faith in God (as the situation is not ideal in the first part of the midrash in which faith is lacking when God says “if only Me they would abandon”).
The midrash is paradoxical as the first part implies that good deeds are more important than faith in God, while the second part implies that faith in God (as the ultimate end of a religious life) is more important than good deeds. In my opinion, the key to resolving the paradox is a fundamental distinction in Jewish law between what should be done ideally (לכתחילה) and what was already done or what one will do not ideally but in point of fact (בדיעבד). If we apply such a distinction to the midrash then the paradox is easily resolved. Ideally, the midrash holds, as expressed in the second part, that faith in God, rather than good deeds, is the ultimate end of a religious life. However, the orthoprax and pragmatic nature of the midrash is revealed in both parts of the midrash. In the first part, in the unfortunate and actual situation where one is forced to choose between faith and good deeds, it is good deeds that take precedence (just as in the case of an unhealthy person physically and mentally or emotionally, the health of the body will take precedence over that of the mind only because physical health is a more urgent matter than mental or emotional health) – but, in the second part, from a pragmatic point of view, the study and observance of Torah will ultimately lead to the ideal of faith in God, the essence of Judaism according to the midrash.
The orthoprax and pragmatic conception of the midrash is in contradistinction to a widespread orthodox and theological conception according to which one who denies the existence of God is a theological heretic. Regarding one who does not believe in God but is moral, the midrash expresses an attitude of tolerance and optimism in that through study and observance of Torah such a person will ultimately come to faith in God. But, if not, there is no hint in the midrash that one who does not believe in God is a heretic even though according to the midrash faith in God is the essence of religion. By the way, Hillel and Rabbi Akiva, the two greatest Talmudic rabbis, (in contradistinction to this Talmudic midrash according to which the essence of Judaism is faith in God) conceive of the essence of Judaism in an orthoprax and anti-theological sense of a moral life of good deeds omitting God from their anti-theological formulations indicating that faith in God is not of the essence of Judaism as a religion – in speaking about the essence of Judaism, Hillel points to the moral principle “what is hateful unto you do not do unto others”, while Rabbi Akiva cites the verse “love your neighbor as yourself”.
In relation to belief in the holiness of the Torah, there is a Talmudic source in which it is written “Moses received Torah from Sinai” (Pirkei Avot 1, 1) – and, the orthoprax and anti-theological formulation in which God is omitted is striking (like the Biblical verse that I previously cited “Moses commanded us Torah, a heritage of the community of Jacob”). We would expect the Talmudic source to say that Moses received Torah from God on Sinai, and not from Sinai. Such an orthoprax and anti-theological formulation “Moses received Torah from Sinai” allows for pluralism. It allows one who identifies with an orthodox conception to understand that Moses received Torah from God on Sinai as reflecting the word and will of God – and, it allows one who identifies with an orthoprax conception to understand that Torah is a product of the historical experience of the Jewish people symbolized by Moses and Sinai. The orthoprax and anti-theological formulation of the Talmudic teaching, in my view, was intended to be inclusive, and to allow for differing understandings.
I want to clarify that in the case of Christianity if one rejects the fundamental theological doctrines of belief in the existence of God and especially belief in Jesus as the messiah, one is not a true Christian and will be regarded as a theological heretic outside the fold – because Christianity is a religion in the orthodox and theological sense of a faith commitment. By contrast, in traditional Judaism, based upon the Hebrew Bible and Talmudic tradition in which there is no binding dogma, one can reject such central beliefs of the Jewish tradition as belief in the existence of God and belief in the holiness of the Torah – and, yet, one is without question still a Jew. Traditional Judaism is a religion in the orthoprax and pragmatic sense of a culture of a people in a nationalistic sense such that being a Jew is first and foremost being a member of a particular people (and, being a Jew is not a matter of adherence to any theological beliefs) – and, the Talmudic rabbis did not define a Jew as outside the fold (as a theological heretic) due to rejection of theological doctrines (even of those doctrines that are central in traditional Judaism).
Moreover, even from an orthodox Jewish point of view, although a Jew who denies central theological beliefs such as belief in the existence of God and belief in the holiness of the Torah that widespread in the orthodox world are regarded (in contradistinction to the Hebrew Bible and Talmudic tradition) as having the status of binding dogma will be widely viewed in the orthodox world as a theological heretic – nevertheless, such a Jew will continue to be regarded as a member of the Jewish people by virtue of having been born of a Jewish mother or having converted (and, significantly, Jews in practice have never put to death heretics as has been widespread in both Christianity and Islam).
In an orthodox conception, then, the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) is sacred in an inherent sense in literally reflecting the very word and will of God from a metaphysical point of view. By contrast, in an orthoprax conception, the Torah is not sacred in an inherent sense as literally the word and will of God, as an orthoprax conception of religion does not presuppose at all the existence of God or belief in the existence of God – and, the Torah is seen in an orthoprax conception as a human document produced by ancient Israelites. In an orthoprax conception, the Torah is sacred for we as Jews because from a historical point of view we the Jewish people accepted the Torah upon us as a sacred and authoritative document, and because we as Jews then relate to the Torah as sacred as an expression of Jewish identity and Jewish culture – and, there is no inherent holiness within the Torah as a human document.
The fundamental difference here between an orthodox and orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah concerns the source and nature of the holiness. An orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah is theological in nature, while an orthoprax conception is anti-theological in nature. In an orthodox conception, the source of the holiness of the Torah is God Above, and the nature of the holiness is metaphysical in reflecting in a literal sense the very word and will of God – and, such holiness of a metaphysical and theological nature is independent of how we as Jews relate to the Torah. In an orthoprax conception, by contrast, the source of the holiness of the Torah is the Jewish people, and the nature of the holiness is historical in reflecting our way as Jews of relating to the Torah as a human document that is a product of Jewish history and culture – and, such holiness in a historical and anti-theological sense is dependent upon the acceptance by the Jewish people of the Torah as a sacred and authoritative document, and upon our attitude as Jews to the Torah in identifying with our heritage.
I want to clarify the nature of an orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah by comparing the Torah and a work of Shakespeare such as the play Othello. But, before I draw such a comparison, I want to clarify that the term Torah, which is a Biblical term and the central term of the Jewish tradition, literally means guidance or instruction.
There are two kinds of guidance in the Jewish tradition that constitute Torah – Halacha (legal guidance) and Aggadah (moral and spiritual guidance). Beyond the literal meaning of the term Torah as guidance, the term is used in the Jewish tradition in several different senses (and, each of these senses has precedent in the Bible) – the term can refer to the 5 Books of Moses in a specific sense, it can refer to Judaism in a broader sense, and in the broadest sense it can refer to wisdom in a universal sense. For example, there is Biblical precedent for the use of the term Torah in the sense of universal wisdom in the verse from the Book of Proverbs (1, 8) – “do not forsake the Torah (wisdom) of your mother” (and, it is clear that the verse is not speaking about Torah in the sense of the 5 Books of Moses or Judaism, but in the sense of universal wisdom that can be learned from any mother whether Jewish or not Jewish).
If we return now to the difference between the Torah in the sense of the 5 Books of Moses and a work of Shakespeare such as the play Othello, I want to make clear that the play Othello without question is Torah in the sense of universal wisdom, and the main message of the play is the very same as the Talmudic teaching (Pirkei Avot 4, 1) – “Who is the truly strong person? The one who controls one’s passions and drives”. And, the play Othello must be distinguished in this regard from, for example, a telephone book that cannot be considered Torah in the sense of universal wisdom, as a telephone book contains only information and no wisdom of a moral or spiritual nature – and, the play Othello also must be distinguished from such a work as Mein Kamph of Adolf Hitler that obviously would not be considered Torah but a violation of Torah in being morally offensive.
From both an orthodox and orthoprax perspective, Othello would not be regarded in the Jewish tradition as sacred even though expressing Torah in the sense of universal wisdom. It is clear that in an orthodox Jewish conception of the holiness of the Torah, in a metaphysical sense reflecting the very word and will of God, no such holiness would reside in the play Othello, and the play would be regarded merely as a human work reflecting human wisdom – and, although the play would be appreciated as constituting Torah (guidance) in the sense of universal wisdom, it would not be considered sacred. In an orthoprax conception both the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) and the play Othello would be regarded as human works (as in an orthoprax conception the existence of God is not presupposed), and both would reflect human wisdom. However, in an orthoprax conception, the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) would be regarded as sacred by we as Jews in being accepted by the Jewish people as a sacred and authoritative document, and as representing the foundation of our Jewish heritage or culture – whereas, the play Othello, even though an expression of Torah in the sense of universal wisdom, would not be regarded in the Jewish tradition as a sacred text in not being a product of the Jewish people and culture.
I want to emphasize that an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) due to the theological nature of the conception is subject to philosophic and theological difficulties and problems regarding the issue of whether the Torah is indeed sacred in a metaphysical sense. By contrast, an orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah in a historical sense is not subject to any philosophic or theological objections or difficulties regarding the question of whether the Torah is sacred – as the conception is not philosophic or theological in nature. It is simply a historical fact that cannot be refuted that the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) as a document was accepted by the Jewish people as sacred and authoritative – and, if I identify with my heritage in my heart, and regard the Torah as sacred for me as a Jew as the foundation of my heritage, then this feeling cannot be refuted by philosophic argument as feelings are not a rational matter subject to philosophic objections or difficulties. However, an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah is a philosophic and theological position that is without question subject to philosophic and theological difficulties and problems that will at least call into question, if not refute, the conception.
There is an obvious philosophic question raised in light of an orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah (not directly connected to the philosophic issue of the source and nature of the holiness of the Torah) of why one who identifies with an orthoprax conception would be observant of Jewish law and traditional Jewish ritual practice. But, this philosophic question of why be observant of Jewish law and traditional Jewish ritual practice is actually a question that both an orthodox and an orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah face. On the one hand, there are those who identify with an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah – and, yet, are not observant of law and ritual. On the other hand, there are those (like myself) who identify with an orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah, and are observant of law and ritual as an expression of Jewish identity, history and culture. In my view, the decision to be, or not to be, observant of a traditional Jewish life of observance of law and ritual is not a philosophic matter of the rational mind at all, but is a matter of the heart – and, I do not think that there is any Jew who chooses to live such a lifestyle that does so as the result of being convinced of some particular philosophic or theological position (orthodox or orthoprax). Rather, those Jews who do choose a traditional lifestyle do so out of a feeling in their heart of attachment to, as well as an appreciation of the beauty of, such a traditional life regardless of their philosophic conception of the holiness of the Torah. In any case, an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah will provide a rationale for observance of Torah only for one who identifies with such a conception, and an orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah will provide a rationale for observance of Torah only for one who identifies with such a conception.
I repeat, though, that an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah is subject to philosophic or theological difficulties and problems in relation to the issue of whether the Torah is truly sacred in a metaphysical sense. By contrast, it would be absurd to ask me in relating to the Torah as a sacred document from an orthoprax point of view as the foundation of my Jewish heritage whether the Torah is truly sacred – for, I am not making any metaphysical claim about the Torah, and I am only expressing my own attitude to the Torah as a sacred document for me in identifying with my heritage.
I will now raise here philosophic or theological difficulties and problems with an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah. I will first raise difficulties of a theological nature concerning the existence and nature of God, and then I will raise difficulties (more serious in my eyes) of a literary nature concerning the fallibility of the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) as a literary document (literary difficulties both from a factual and moral point of view). Both the theological and literary difficulties I will raise at least call into question, if not refute, an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah.
An Orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah clearly assumes the existence of God. If the notion of God is defined as a metaphysical and non-empirical entity transcending time and space, and transcending our sensory experience as human beings, then the existence of God cannot be demonstrated or refuted on the basis of empirical evidence – as no empirical, factual evidence can be brought to demonstrate the existence of such a metaphysical entity, and no evidence can be brought to refute the existence of such an entity. No factual evidence can be brought to demonstrate or refute the truth of metaphysical claims that are by definition not empirical in nature. To speak of the existence of such a metaphysical entity as God transcending human sensory experience is in effect the equivalent of speaking of the existence of a unicorn or flying elephant – maybe there is such a thing and maybe there is not. And, logic cannot demonstrate the truth of metaphysical (or factual) claims – as logic demonstrates truth only that is a matter of definition.
In addition, there is a further assumption underlying an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah relating to the nature of God – an assumption not only that God exists but that God has conscious will and that God can speak. Conscious will is a human trait, and necessarily implies that a human being changes (as in changing one’s decision or choice) – and, if such a trait is attributed to God, then this would necessarily imply that God can change raising the philosophic question of how a perfect God can change (as any change in God would be from perfection to imperfection). Speech (verbal communication) is a human activity, and presupposes an anthropomorphistic (human form) conception of God. Speaking is a human activity presupposing physical form of a human being – a mouth, tongue and vocal chords (just as walking is an activity that presupposes having legs). Does God have a mouth, tongue and vocal chords with which to speak? Even more importantly, though, if we assume that God has conscious will, then where is this God when there is evil and suffering? Why, for example, doesn’t this God prevent evil and suffering such as the death of an innocent child due to an illness? If, as written in the Torah (Exodus 3, 9), God heard the cries of the people Israel, and saw their oppression, in redeeming them from slavery and oppression in Egypt – shouldn’t such a God have all the more so redeemed the Jewish people from the Nazi holocaust?
Leaving aside these theological difficulties in relation to an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah as reflecting the very word and will of God, the more serious difficulties, in my eyes, with such a conception are difficulties of a literary nature (both from a factual and moral point of view).
If the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) is viewed as reflecting the very word and will of God, then it follows that the Torah should be infallible as a document. Yet, a literary analysis of the Torah at least calls into question (from a factual and moral point of view) the assumption that the Torah is infallible (and suggests human authorship of the Torah). I want to emphasize that difficulties of a literary nature call into question whether what is written in the plain meaning of Scripture in the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) as a document can be accepted as the infallible word of God, as assumed in an orthodox conception of the holiness of the Torah – and, maintaining belief in the infallibility of the Torah as the very word of God will require, in my view, a fairly large amount of mental gymnastics and rationalization (characterized by distorting, and twisting out of shape, the plain meaning of Scripture in the case of such literary difficulties).
From a factual point of view, the very opening sentence of the Torah (Genesis 1, 1) is ungrammatical and if it were translated literally it would read – “In the beginning of God created the universe”. Similarly, the Biblical verse (Leviticus 19, 18) that is usually translated “love your neighbor as yourself” is also ungrammatical, and if literally translated would read – “love to your neighbor as yourself”. If we are assuming that the Torah reflects the very word of God, would God not know Hebrew grammar?
Also from a factual point of view, there are clear contradictions in the Torah. In the opening Biblical account of the creation of the universe, the human being is created on the sixth day after vegetation has sprouted from the earth on the third day – while, in the following story of Adam and Eve the human being is created when vegetation has not yet sprouted from the earth (Genesis 2, 5-7). Similarly, who are the wives of Esau? In one account (Genesis 26, 34) it is written that the wives of Esau were “Judith the daughter of Beeri the Hittite, and Basemat the daughter of Elon the Hittite”, while in another account (Genesis 36, 2-3) it is written that the wives of Esau were “Adah the daughter of Elon the Hittite, and Oholibamah the daughter of Anah, the daughter of Zibeon the Hivite and Basemat Ishmael’s daughter”. If we are assuming that the Torah reflects the very word of God, would God not know whether the human being was created before or after the sprouting of vegetation, and would God not know who the wives of Esau were?
And, from a factual point of view, in the opening Biblical account of the creation of the universe, we have a clear mistake from a scientific and astronomical point of view in that at the end of each of the six days of creation it is written “and there was evening and there was morning” – and, the obvious question from a scientific and astronomical point of view is how there can be 3 days of creation in which there was evening and morning prior to the creation of the sun on the fourth day of creation. If we are assuming that the Torah reflects the very word of God, would God not know that there can be no notion of evening and morning without the sun?
From a moral point of view, there are a number of passages of the Torah that are, on the face of it, simply morally offensive. In the Book of Deuteronomy (20, 16-18) it is written explicitly that the Israelites are commanded by God to exterminate various peoples in the land of Canaan – Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites. Or, also in the Book of Deuteronomy (21, 18-21) it is written explicitly that a rebellious son who is a “glutton and drunkard”, and does not obey his parents, is to be put to death.
In both these cases, the Talmudic rabbis uprooted these commandments. In the case of the commandment given to the Israelites to exterminate various Canaanite peoples, Maimonides codifies on the basis of the Talmudic tradition in his law code (laws of kings and wars, ch. 6) that this commandment applies to these Canaanite nations (including Amalek as well in which there is a command of God in the Torah to wipe out the memory of Amalek that is understood by the prophet Samuel in the Book of Samuel as a command to exterminate the Amalekite nation) only if they refuse an offer of peace (and, this is not written in the plain meaning of Scripture). In the case of the rebellious son, there is a position in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 71a) that there never was and never will be such a case as the rebellious son in practice, and the law is written in Scripture only so that we may learn from it from a theoretical point of view.
However, the uprooting of these commandments in the Jewish tradition only means that they were not to be carried out in practice – and, the philosophic question remains as to how God in the plain meaning of Scripture could command laws that are blatantly morally offensive to such an extent that the ancient Talmudic tradition uprooted such laws. In what way can we regard the Torah as a literary document as the infallible word of God if there are such passages as these in which laws commanded by God in the plain meaning of Scripture need to be uprooted by the Talmudic rabbis?
In identifying with an orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah, I do not face any of these theological or literary difficulties. I obviously do not face theological difficulties because an orthoprax conception of the holiness of the Torah does not presuppose the existence of God or belief in the existence of God. I view the Torah as a human work produced by ancient Israelites and as sacred as the foundation of the Jewish heritage (and not in any metaphysical sense). I do not face any literary difficulties because in an orthoprax conception the Torah as a human document is not infallible. I view the Torah as sacred not because the Torah is the last word (infallible) as the very word of God, but because the Torah is the first word of traditional Judaism as the historical, moral, spiritual and inspirational foundation of the Jewish heritage revealing the moral and spiritual direction and orientation of traditional Judaism.
As a human document, the Torah produced in the historical context of the ancient Israelite world, certainly contains passages that are not relevant to us in our contemporary world (such as genealogical lists in the Torah), and certainly contains passages that from our contemporary point of view are primitive or even morally offensive (such as any number of laws in the Torah) – however, the Torah also includes much material that not only was truly enlightened in its historical context of the ancient Israelite world but also material that is enlightened even today in our contemporary world. All of the material of the Torah whether relevant, primitive, or enlightened is sacred for me because the Torah as a document is the foundation of the Jewish heritage.
A Talmudic precedent for an orthoprax conception of the holiness and authority of the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses)
I want to cite, and analyze, a remarkable Talmudic midrash (commentary) in which Rava, one of the greatest Talmudic rabbis, presents an orthoprax and anti-theological conception of Judaism in which the source of the holiness and authority of the Torah is historical and anti-theological (and not metaphysical or theological). The Talmudic source (Shabbat 88a) is based upon the Biblical verse (Exodus 19, 7) “and they stood at the foot of the mountain” – referring to the people Israel standing at the foot of Mount Sinai prior to the revelation to Moses:
Rabbi Abdimi ben Hama ben Hasa said – this teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, overturned the mountain upon them like an inverted cask, and said to them; if you accept the Torah, it is well, and if not, there shall be your burial. Rabbi Acha ben Jacob said, this furnishes a strong protest against the Torah. Rava said, yet even so, they accepted it in the days of Achashverus, as it is written, “the Jews confirmed and accepted upon them” (Esther 9, 27) – they confirmed what they had accepted long before.
Rabbi Abdimi ben Hama ben Hasa interprets midrashically (not according to its plain meaning) the Biblical verse “and they stood at the foot of the mountain” as meaning that God threatened the people Israel with death, by bringing the mountain of Sinai crashing down upon them, if they did not accept the Torah. The phrase “this furnishes a strong protest” is an Aramaic phrase that is a technical, Halachic (legal) term. The term means that an agreement or contract entered into under duress has no binding force. The receiving of the Torah at Mount Sinai, according to the Bible, was part of a mutual covenant or agreement between God and the Jewish people. Thus, Rabbi Acha ben Jacob objects that if, according to the midrash, God threatened the Jewish people with death unless they accept the Torah, then the Torah was accepted under duress and has no binding authority over the Jewish people. Rava answers that, in any case, at a later period historically, the Jewish people accepted the Torah upon themselves voluntarily. He quotes from the Book of Esther (9, 27), “the Jews confirmed and accepted upon them”, which he interprets to mean that the Jewish people confirmed as binding upon them what they had previously accepted at Sinai.
In my view, Rava’s answer is revolutionary and reflects an orthoprax and anti-theological conception in which the source of authority of the Torah as a binding legal and spiritual constitution upon the people Israel is not the result of the Torah being Divinely revealed from God Above to the Jewish people below as part of a mutual covenant entered into by God and the people Israel – as depicted in the Book of Exodus in the Torah. Rather, in Rava’s view, the source of authority of the Torah is historical, and not theological, in that the Jewish people accepted the Torah voluntarily upon themselves as binding as a unilateral decision, as reflected in the verse that Rava cites as a proof text that does not mention God – “the Jews confirmed and accepted upon them”.
I want to point out two things in connection with the verse from the Book of Esther that serves as Rava’s proof text. First, it is not by accident that Rava, in formulating an anti-theological conception of the source of authority of the Torah, has chosen a verse from the Book of Esther. The Book of Esther stands out in the Hebrew Bible, as a great example of the orthoprax and anti-theological nature of Biblical theology. The term God does not appear even one time in the Book of Esther, and everything that occurs in the story appears to happen merely by chance. The very name of the holy day of Purim (based upon the story) comes from the word “Pur” in the story (Esther 9, 26), which means “lot” in the sense of the random casting of lots in an attempt to exterminate the Jews (Esther 3, 7 and 9, 24).
Incidentally, there is a Talmudic source (Moed Katan 28a) in which Rava argues that attaining a long life, children and sustenance are matters not of Divine providence but of luck or chance. In the Talmudic source, Rav Joseph is celebrating his 60th birthday, and in an ensuing discussion Rava says that attaining a long life (and he says the same of children and sustenance) depends not on merit (Divine providence) but on luck. Rava points out that both Rabbah and Rav Hisda were righteous, and yet Rabbah died at a young age while Rav Hisda lived a long life – and, thus, Rava prefers to view the attaining of a long life not as a matter of Divine providence but of luck or chance.
It is often rationalized that what appears to be happening by chance in the Book of Esther is in reality Divine providence, as God is directing affairs behind the scenes. This is a rationalization because it turns a completely secular story, not mentioning God, upside down, interpreting it in accordance with a major theme of the Hebrew Bible of Divine providence. This is a theme, for example, of the story of Joseph and his brothers, in which Joseph sees the hand of God directing affairs in his having been sold into slavery in Egypt, when he says to his brothers – “So now it was not you who sent me here but God” (Genesis 45, 8). The Book of Esther, in which God does not appear, and is on the face of it a glaring exception to a major theme of the Bible that God directs all human actions, is then rationalized and twisted so that it conforms to the Biblical theme of Divine providence. I want to suggest that the term God does not appear in the Book of Esther because the book is a completely secular book, in which the focus is not God but the people Israel.
The Book of Esther is a story of an attempt to exterminate the Jewish people, written long before Adolph Hitler and the Nazis. Furthermore, I want to suggest that in the Biblical conception, which is orthoprax and pragmatic in nature, there is no fear of raising the possibility that God does not exist (and is not provident) and that events in life may occur merely by chance, as expressed on the face of it in the Book of Esther. The Book of Esther, in my view, is characterized by an attitude of faith in the sense of an optimistic outlook, according to which even in the case that God does not exist (and is not provident) and events may occur by chance, we as human beings are able to take responsibility for our lives and influence events (at least to a certain extent) thus improving our “lot”.
The Book of Esther is a story of anti-Semitism (Jew hatred) and persecution of the Jewish people, and thus there is no mention of God – and, no connection to theology, as the entire focus is the Jewish people. Indeed, there is a central passage that, in my view, stands out as a high point of the book, in which Mordechai expresses a truly profound spiritual and religious message to Esther. Mordechai wants Esther, the queen, to intercede before the king on behalf of her people, the Jewish people, who are to be exterminated. However, according to ancient Persian court procedures, none (including the queen) may approach the king without being called, under penalty of death – unless the king allows the person to live (Esther 4, 11). So, Esther must risk her life if she is to approach the king on behalf of her people. Mordechai tells Esther (Esther 4, 13-14):
Do not think in your heart that you shall escape in the king’s house any more than all the other Jews. For if you do at all remain silent at this time, then shall relief and deliverance arise to the Jews from elsewhere. But you and your father’s house shall perish. And who knows whether you are not come to royal estate for such a time as this?
Mordechai here makes three points of a deeply spiritual and religious nature, especially expressing his profound faith in the sense of an optimistic attitude. First, if Esther does not intercede her fate will be the same as that of all other Jews – “Do not think in your heart that you shall escape in the king’s house any more than all the other Jews”. Here Mordechai is encouraging Esther to take responsibility regarding the fate of her people (even though events may occur by chance) by pointing out that her own personal fate or lot will not be any different than other Jews. Second, in any case, salvation shall come, if not from her, then from elsewhere – “For if you do at all remain silent at this time, then shall relief and deliverance arise to the Jews from elsewhere”. This is a profoundly spiritual and religious message of faith in the sense of optimism and trust that there will be salvation for the Jewish people, if not through Esther then through some other agency. However, Mordechai, strikingly, does not say that salvation shall come from God! Mordechai’s expression of faith that salvation will come is expressed in a completely secular, anti-theological formulation. Third, Mordechai asks Esther to consider that perhaps her mission in life, and the ultimate reason that she has been chosen queen, is to intercede and save the Jewish people – “who knows whether you are not come to royal estate for such a time as this?”. This, too, is a profoundly spiritual and religious message that Esther may have been singled out and chosen for some larger, transcendent purpose or mission – perhaps chosen by fate or chance (lot), and not necessarily by God. Significantly absent is any reference by Mordechai to her having been chosen by God. Parenthetically, this message may be understood allegorically as referring to the Jewish people as having some larger, transcendent purpose (the notion of chosen people in the Biblical conception is intended to be a feeling not of superiority but of responsibility). But, significantly, the message is expressed by Mordechai not in a religious or theological formulation of God having chosen Esther for some larger, transcendent purpose – but, rather the message is expressed in a completely secular formulation encouraging Esther to take responsibility regarding the fate of her people in viewing herself as having been singled out and chosen perhaps by fate or chance for some larger, transcendent purpose or mission without any mention of God.
From this remarkable passage it is clear that, in the Biblical conception, such central religious ideas as responsibility, faith, salvation and a sense of transcendent purpose or mission may be expressed in a completely secular formulation (the formulation or vocabulary in which the ideas are expressed not necessarily being crucial). In Rava’s anti-theological conception, the Jewish people themselves are the source of authority of the Torah in voluntarily accepting the Torah as binding upon themselves, and thus he chooses his proof text from the Book of Esther, in which the entire focus of the book is the Jewish people – and not only is God not mentioned, but religious messages of the book are formulated in a completely secular formulation.
There is a second point that stands out in Rava’s choice of a proof text from the Book of Esther, which is even more important and crucial in understanding Rava’s philosophic conception. The Talmudic rabbis did not present philosophic ideas in the form of philosophic analysis and argument. Here, Rava is no exception, and his philosophic conception is revealed in his choice of a Biblical verse as a proof text. If Rava did not intend to challenge the Biblical conception of the covenant of Sinai, in formulating a secular, anti-theological conception, then he could have cited proof texts from either the Book of Joshua (Joshua 24, 19-26) or the Book of Nechemiah (Nechemiah 8, 1-18), where in both these cases it is recorded that a covenant renewal ceremony (renewing the covenant of Sinai) took place at a later historical date. In both cases the Torah is presented as being given by God, and the acceptance of the Torah by the Jewish people is primarily an expression of obedience to God’s will and authority. Therefore, if Rava wanted to preserve the Biblical conception of the covenant of Sinai, as depicted in the Book of Exodus in which the Torah was given from God Above to the Jewish people below as part of a mutual covenant, and, at the same time, answering Rabbi Acha ben Jacob’s objection (that the covenant of Sinai is not binding as the Torah was accepted under duress at Sinai, according to the midrash), then he could have chosen either of these sources from Joshua or Nechemiah, in which the covenant of Sinai was renewed voluntarily by the Jewish people.
Moreover, Rava cites a verse from the Book of Esther (“the Jews confirmed and accepted upon them”) as his proof text that in its plain meaning, in the context of the story, is referring to the Jewish people confirming and accepting upon themselves the holy day of Purim, and has nothing to do with the acceptance of the Torah! Remarkably, Rava is willing to ignore the sources from Joshua and Nechemiah that in their plain meaning speak of the voluntary acceptance of the Torah and the renewal of the covenant of Sinai, as part of mutual covenant between God and the Jewish people – and, to uproot the verse from the Book of Esther, out of its context (relating to the holy day of Purim), and to use it as a proof text for his own secular and anti-theological conception that the source of authority of the Torah is the historical and unilateral acceptance of the Torah by the Jewish people as binding upon themselves.
I want to add one further and compelling piece of evidence that Rava is indeed consciously rejecting the Biblical concept of Divine revelation as a source of authority of the Torah as binding upon the Jewish people. In the Talmud (Megillah 7a), a remarkable debate is recorded regarding the Book of Esther. It is known that there was debate regarding a number of books of the Hebrew Bible, including the Book of Esther, as to whether they were to be included in the canonization of the Hebrew Bible by the Talmudic rabbis. The obvious reason that there was a question regarding the Book of Esther is that, as I have indicated, the term God does not appear in the book at all.
In the debate recorded in the Talmud, various rabbis attempt to demonstrate that the Book of Esther must have been composed under the inspiration of the Divine Spirit. For example, one such proof is brought by Rabbi Eliezer, who cites the verse “and Haman said in his heart” (Esther 6, 6). The background is that the king, Achashverus, seeks to honor Mordechai, and Haman mistakenly thinks that the king seeks to honor him. Rabbi Eliezer’s point is that the Biblical author could not have known what Haman was thinking unless inspired by the Divine Spirit. Several other proofs of a similar nature are brought by other rabbis. The Talmud brings the opinion of Shmuel, who was not part of the debate. Shmuel says, “had I been there, I would have given a proof superior to all”, and he cites the same verse cited by Rava in the previous source – “the Jews confirmed and accepted upon them” (Esther 9, 27). The very same Rava then says that all of the other proofs (such as that of Rabbi Eliezer) can be refuted except that of Shmuel. For example, regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s proof, Rava points out that “it is reasonable to suppose that Haman would think so (that the king wanted to honor him), because there was no one who was so high in the esteem of the king as he was”.
Thus, Rava gives a completely naturalistic explanation as to how the author of the Book of Esther could reasonably infer Haman’s thoughts without being inspired by the Divine Spirit. Rava similarly refutes the other proofs of a similar nature. However, Shmuel’s proof cannot be so refuted because it is not a philosophic proof. The proof text of Shmuel implies that, in Shmuel’s view, the sanctity of the Book of Esther is not due to theological reasons (in being composed under the inspiration of the Divine Spirit), but due to historical circumstances. The Jewish people accepted the holy day of Purim upon them and the Book of Esther as sacred, and such a historical fact cannot be refuted by philosophic argument. Rava then adopts Shmuel’s argument regarding Purim and the Book of Esther, and applies it to the Torah. On the basis of this Talmudic source recording the debate regarding the Book of Esther, it is clear that Rava is aware that philosophic argument (and faith in a philosophic or theological sense), in being subject to philosophic counter-argument and refutation, is a weak basis upon which to establish the binding authority of the Torah. He prefers to establish the authority of the Torah independent of such a concept as Divine revelation, simply on the basis of the historical fact that the Jewish people accepted the Torah upon themselves as binding, which cannot be refuted by philosophic argument. For Rava, the binding authority of the Torah is not due to theological reasons (as the Divinely revealed word of God) but due to the Torah being accepted, historically, by the Jewish people as binding upon them.
Rava does not necessarily reject the concept of the Torah as the Divinely revealed word of God in his citing the verse, “they confirmed what they had accepted long before”, which means what they accepted long before at Sinai. Significantly absent from this verse, though, is any mention of God – and, Rava in applying the verse to the Torah is clearly indicating that the source of authority of the Torah is not due to the Torah being accepted as the Divinely revealed word of God, but due to the acceptance of the Torah by the Jewish people as binding upon them. Rava simply ignores the philosophic question as to whether the Torah represents the Divinely revealed word of God and, if so, in what sense. Rava, like other sources that I cited earlier, entirely omits the concept of God from his formulation – and, such anti-theological formulation serves to unite rather than divide the Jewish people by seeking points of agreement rather than disagreement. Every Jew, from secular through ultra-orthodox, can identify with Rava’s anti-theological formulation that historically the Jewish people accepted the Torah upon them as binding. Such a matter is simply a matter of historical fact that cannot be disputed. By contrast, whether the Torah truly represents the Divinely revealed word of God or not is a matter of philosophic debate.
Rava is not challenging in a philosophic sense the concept of Divine revelation itself – rather, he is challenging in a pragmatic sense the concept of Divine revelation as a basis upon which to establish the authority of the Torah as binding upon the Jewish people. Rava is not a systematic philosopher, but a teacher and authoritative interpreter of the Torah, the constitution of the Jewish people. Furthermore, his anti-theological conception flows from an opposition to philosophy in the sense that the philosophic concept of Divine revelation cannot provide, in his view, a strong basis upon which to establish the authority of the Torah as binding upon the Jewish people. Even more importantly, in my opinion, Rava is actually not even relating to, or concerned with, an abstract question of philosophic thought. Rava, as a teacher and authoritative interpreter of the Torah, is concerned not with the abstract, philosophic meaning of the concept of Divine revelation, but with a much more pragmatic question regarding the source of authority of the Torah as binding upon the Jewish people.
In my view, Rava is very much aware of the orthoprax nature of Judaism as a way of life – characterized not just by central beliefs, but especially by moral and legal obligations and commitments. The central question for Rava is the pragmatic question of what is the authority for such a way of life. In Rava’s anti-theological conception, the source of authority of the Torah is not in its being the Divinely revealed word of God, though this is a central idea of the Bible and Jewish tradition (which he does not necessarily reject), but in its being accepted historically by the Jewish people as binding upon them. The implications here are enormous as Rava provides a rationale for observance of tradition not due to theological reasons but as an expression of Jewish history and culture. Such a rationale does not presuppose the existence of God, or belief in the existence of God, and can thus appeal to secular Jews including even atheists who may not believe in the existence of God. According to academic scholarship it is widely accepted that Moses did not write the Torah (the 5 Books of Moses) and that the Torah did not come from Sinai. It is clear that Rava would not have been threatened by such scholarship as in Rava’s conception the sanctity and authority of the Torah are due to historical reasons – the Torah was accepted historically by the Jewish people as sacred and authoritative no matter who wrote the Torah and no matter when the Torah was written. Similarly, Rava, in my opinion, would not have been threatened by the apparent fallibility of the Torah reflected in the plain meaning of Scripture – the Torah was accepted historically by the Jewish people as sacred and authoritative even if not an infallible document (reflecting the very word of God).
It has been said of Rabbi Mordechai Kaplan, the founder of the contemporary reconstructionist movement, that his conception of Judaism as a civilization (culture) represents a “Copernican revolution” in that the Torah is for him a creation of the Jewish people arising out of their historical experience, and does not represent the Divinely revealed will of God in a literal sense from Above to below – shifting the focus from God Above to the Jewish people below (as Copernicus shifted the focus from the earth to the sun). I want to suggest that Rava, in conceiving of the source of authority of the Torah as being accepted historically by the Jewish people as binding upon them, preceded Rabbi Kaplan by over 1500 years in creating such a “Copernican revolution”. Rava presents an orthoprax and anti-theological conception of Judaism in that the basis of Jewish identity and observance of Jewish tradition is a matter of Jewish history and peoplehood rather than theology.
I repeat that Rava is relating to a pragmatic question – what is the source of authority of the Torah as the way of life of the Jewish people? The answer to this question in the plain meaning of Scripture, as depicted in the Book of Exodus, is that the Torah is obligatory upon the Jewish people as the Divinely revealed will of God given from God Above to the Jewish people below as part of the Covenant of Moses (the Torah from God on Sinai). Rava (who in his Talmudic thinking is not fundamentalist and not bound by the plain meaning of Scripture) rejects this Biblical answer, and in interpreting the Biblical verse “the Jews confirmed and accepted upon them” not according to its plain meaning is suggesting that the authority of the Torah as the way of life of the Jewish people comes from the history of the Jewish people. Not only has Rava then shifted the focus in his Copernican revolution from God and theology to the Jewish people and history – but, he has shifted the focus from the Covenant of Moses (religion) to the Covenant of Abraham (peoplehood) as the source of authority of the Torah. In so doing, Rava has presented a rationale for observance of Jewish tradition not as a matter of faith or theology but as a matter of history and culture, which can be identified with across the Jewish spectrum including even by Jews who may not believe in the existence of God at all.